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Bericht des BIOst Nr. 29/1996
Kurzfassung
Vorbemerkung
Dieser Bericht beschreibt und analysiert die geschichtliche Entwicklung der russischen Bezie-
hungen zur  chinesischen Insel  Taiwan  und  zur  Kuomintang (KMT),  sowohl während ihrer 
Herrschaft über China wie nach ihrem Rückzug auf Taiwan im Jahre 1949. Das Hauptgewicht 
liegt auf  den Ereignissen der letzten Jahre seit  der Verbesserung der Beziehungen zwischen 
Moskau und Taipeh und den seitdem erfolgten Fortschritten.
Ergebnisse
1. Seit der Errichtung einer ständigen diplomatischen Mission in China im Jahre 1861 beob-
achtete  Rußland  aufmerksam das  japanische  Eindringen  in  Taiwan.  Einige  russische 
Diplomaten  ebenso  wie  einige  prominente  Taiwanesen  drängten  den  Zaren  zur 
Intervention, aber St. Petersburg nahm davon aus einer Reihe von Gründen Abstand.
2. Zwischen den zwanziger und vierziger Jahren war das bolschewistische Rußland stark in die 
politischen Ereignisse in China verwickelt. Dies drückte dem Schicksal des Landes und 
insbesondere dem der KMT einen Stempel auf. Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Kreml und 
der KMT entwickelten sich dabei von einer revolutionären Allianz zur offenen Feindschaft.
3. Nach dem Abschluß des Vertrages zwischen Stalin und Mao (1950) und während des Korea-
Krieges (1950-1953)  kam es zur  vollständigen Entfremdung zwischen der UdSSR und 
dem KMT-Regime auf Taiwan. Als sich in den sechziger Jahren die Beziehungen zwischen 
Moskau und Beijing verschlechterten, kam es zu Geheimkontakten mit Taipei, die jedoch 
folgenlos blieben.
4. Die "Perestroika" und das "neues Denken" in der UdSSR eröffneten Möglichkeiten für ein 
Tauwetter in den sowjetisch-taiwanesischen Beziehungen. Aber der Annäherungsprozeß 
verlief langsam, da die alte Garde der KMT gegenüber Moskau mißtrauisch blieb und der 
Kreml eine Konfrontation mit Beijing befürchtete. 1990 konnten beide Seiten den Enthusi-
asmus nicht länger zügeln, der sich zwischen sowjetischen und taiwanesischen Unterneh-
menskreisen entwickelt hatte. Die VR China appellierte an die "sozialistische Solidarität" 
Gorbatschows, und dieser versuchte alles, die Forderungen Beijings in bezug auf offizielle 
Kontakte vis-ŕ-vis Taiwan zufriedenzustellen.
5. 1992  veränderten sich die Bedingungen in Rußland grundlegend. Rußland hörte auf,  ein 
"sozialistischer Staat" zu sein, und konzentrierte seine Aufmerksamkeit auf den Westen. 
Für die russischen Demokraten war Taiwan ein weitaus ansprechenderer Partner als das 
kommunistische  China.  Taiwan  hoffte  seinerseits  darauf,  offizielle  Beziehungen  mit 
seinem früheren Gegner zu etablieren.
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6. Die anfängliche Euphorie, die mit der Verbesserung der russisch-taiwanesischen Beziehungen 
einherging, war nur von kurzer Dauer. Ein konservativer Schwenk in Rußland hatte eine 
Reorientierung  der  Beziehungen auf  China  und  eine  Abkühlung  der  Beziehungen zu 
Taiwan zur Folge. Entsprechend sank das Interesse Taiwans an Rußland.
7. Dennoch gab es weitere Fortschritte in den Beziehungen zwischen Moskau und Taiwan und 
es wurden einige rechtliche Grundlagen gelegt. Am 16. April 1992 vereinbarten beide Sei-
ten die Bildung von "Koordinationskommissionen für wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Zu-
sammenarbeit" (MTC und TMC) zur Föderung der Beziehungen in verschiedenen nichtpo-
litischen Bereichen. Beijing protestierte gegen diese Vereinbarung, und Präsident Jelzin 
veröffentlichte am 15. September 1992 ein Dekret, in dem er Rußlands Position des "einen 
China" bekräftigte und jede offiziellen oder politischen Kontakte mit Taiwan untersagte. 
Darüber hinaus erzielten Moskau und Beijing im Herbst 1992 Einverständnis über die Be-
grenzung der russisch-taiwanesischen Beziehungen. So bedürfen die rechtlichen Grundla-
gen der Beziehungen zwischen Rußland und der ROC (Republic of China) ohne Zweifel 
einer weiteren Verbesserung.
8. Heute  ist  der politische Dialog zwischen Moskau  und Taipeh eingeschränkter  als in  den 
Jahren 1991 und 1992. Das TMC hat ein permanentes Büro in Moskau eröffnet, aber die 
russische Seite hat aufgrund innenpolitischer Auseinandersetzungen immer noch keinerlei 
Vertretung in Taiwan. Dies hat dennoch einige russische politische Parteien und parlamen-
tarische Kreise nicht von der Förderung des Austausches mit Taiwan abgehalten.
9. Experten stimmen darin überein, daß es für die Entwicklung von Handel und wirtschaftlicher 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen Rußland und Taiwan ein großes Potential gibt. Aber das einzig 
dynamische Element stellt der bilaterale Handel dar. Bei jährlichen Wachstumsraten von 
über 60% ist er durch einen überwiegenden Handelsbilanzüberschuß für Rußland, das für 
die Insel  zu  einem der  Hauptlieferanten von Stahl  und Baumwolle geworden ist,  ge-
kennzeichnet. Zeitweilig spielten beide Seiten auch mit der Idee von Waffenlieferungen, 
nahmen davon aber wieder Abstand. Von Investitionen in Rußland hält sich die taiwanesi-
sche Seite jedoch zurück, da der russische Markt als problematisch eingeschätzt wird.
10.Der humanitäre Aspekte spielt in den Beziehungen kaum eine Rolle. Dennoch gibt es einen 
Kulturaustausch, wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und gemeinsame Forschungsprogram-
me. Außerdem studiert eine zunehmende Zahl taiwanesischer Studenten an russischen Uni-
versitäten. Auch die Beziehungen zwischen den Medien haben zugenommen.
11.Die  Taiwan-Krise im März 1996  hat  zu  keiner  Veränderung der  Beziehungen Moskaus 
geführt, weder zu Beijing noch zu Taipeh. Die russische Regierung hielt sich mit Stellung-
nahmen zurück, die russische Medienberichterstattung war nicht offen protaiwanesisch.
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1. Historical Overview
1.1 Tsarist Russia and Taiwan
With the establishment of the permanent diplomatic mission in China in 1861 Russia made its 
first contacts with Taiwan. Having closely observed Japanese encroachments on Taiwan, Russian 
diplomats informed the Tsarist government of Tokyo's plans to annex the island.1 In the aftermath 
of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov-Rostovsky reported 
to Tsar Nicholas II that "the inhabitants of Formosa have expressed through the Chinese gov-
ernment their desire to be taken under the protection of Russia"2. Upon receiving Tokyo's as-
surances of  the  international  status  of  the  Taiwan  straits,  however,  the  Tsar  accepted the 
annexation of  the  island by the  Japanese.3 The  unhappy inhabitants  of  Taiwan  once again 
appealed to the Russian government through various channels "to move troops" to the island, "to 
take control over Formosa", "to make the Taiwanese subjects of Russia" etc.4 The outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese war in 1904 led to a resurgence of Russian interest in Taiwan. A number of 
Russian naval officers and military agents put forward plans to use the Russian fleet in support of 
the anti-Japanese movement on the island.5 Tsar Nicholas II, however, cautioned the Russian 
military attaché in Beijing against embarking on any adventures in Taiwan and gave instructions 
to limit the Russian role to the gathering of information.6
1.2 Moscow and the Kuomintang (KMT) from the 1920s to the 1940s
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese republic and the KMT, used to stress that the revolution in 
China would not be successful unless the Chinese "learned from Russia",7 and he repeatedly 
expressed gratitude to the Bolshevik government.8 Chiang Kai-shek, as chief-of-staff of Dr. Sun's 
armed forces, actively participated in the development of co-operation between Moscow and the 
KMT. Experts in the Kremlin characterised Chiang as "a leftist", a man "very close to us".9 After 
the death of Dr. Sun in 1925 frictions surfaced between the right and left wings of the KMT. 
Chiang Kai-shek crushed the left, communist wing and turned from a friend into a foe of Soviet 
Russia.10 Hostility continued until 1937. Chiang's son and future president of the ROC, Chiang 
Ching-kuo, spent the period from 1925 to 1937 in the USSR.
In 1937 Chiang Kai-shek agreed to form a united front with the Chinese Communists to oppose 
imminent Japanese aggression. The initiative for this move had come from the Communist side, 
1 Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Empire (FPARE), the main archive 1-9, list 8, 1872-1875, file 8, 
pp. 9-10.
2 F. Toder: "Istoriya taivan'skikh issledovanii v Rossii", in: Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 5, 1993, p. 47.
3 Ibid.
4 FPARE, Chinese Archive, list  491, file 1, 579, pp. 19-20. F. Todor: op. cit., p. 47. See also E. Bazhanov 
(Ed.):  "Problems and Prospects  of  Development of  Non-Governmental  Ties  between Russia  and Taiwan, 
proceedings of a multinational conference", Moscow, The Diplomatic Academy Press, 1993, pp. 133-134.
5 FPARE, Japanese Archive, list 493, file 575, p. 8.
6 Ibid. 
7 S. Tikhvinsky/Sun Yat-sen: "Vneshnepoliticheskie vozzreniya i praktika", Moscow, Nauka, 1964, p. 323.
8 "Zhongsu guanxi" (Sino-Soviet Relations), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1984, p. 2.
9 "Kitaiskaya traditsionnaya kul’tura i  problemy modernizatsii",  Moscow, Institut  Dal'nego Vostoka,  1994, 
p. 49.
10 V. Vorontsov: "Sud’ba kitaiskogo Bonaparta", Moscow, Politizdat, 1989, pp. 79-84.
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which acted  on  the  advice  of  Moscow.  Soviet  aid  began  to  pour  into  China:  armaments, 
ammunition,  transport.  Chiang  Kai-shek  publicly  expressed gratitude  to  the  USSR for  the 
"unselfish character  of  assistance  to  the  Chinese  people  in  their  struggle  against  Japanese 
aggression"11. Nonetheless, the Kremlin's relations with the KMT were still by no means smooth: 
Moscow protested against Chiang's attacks on local Communists, and the KMT was shocked by 
the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality  pact.12 Mutual  suspicions continued throughout 
World  War  II  and  Chiang  denounced  the  decision  taken  by  the  Allies  during  the  Yalta 
conference of February 4-11, 1945 to bring the USSR into the anti-Japanese campaign in the Far 
East. Chiang was afraid that Moscow would take over Manchuria and strengthen the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).
While in fact helping the Communists, Stalin signed a "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" with 
the KMT government on August 14, 1945 and agreed with its partners in the anti-Hitler coalition 
to try to achieve the termination of civil conflict in China. Stalin advised Mao Zedong to find 
ways of co-operating with Chiang Kai-shek.13 Mao criticised Stalin on many occasions for "not 
allowing the Chinese to accomplish the revolution, not believing in the strength of the Chinese 
Communists and demanding that peace be made with Chiang Kai-shek at any cost".14 In July 
1949 Stalin admitted that the USSR had "put obstacles" in the way of the Chinese Communists 
and that he regretted it.15 Mao Zedong’s trip to the USSR in 1949-1950 put an end to relations 
between Moscow and the KMT for a long time. And yet, when the KMT embarked upon a new 
life in Taiwan, it was clear that , while hating and fearing Moscow, it had also learned many 
lessons from it: the role, functions and structure of the ruling party; methods of mobilisation and 
control of the masses; the supremacy of state interests; the organisation of counterintelligence; the 
moral requirements of party membership etc.16
1.3 Total alienation: 1950-1985
With the forging of the Moscow-Beijing alliance (1950) and the outbreak of the Korean war 
(1950-1953) Soviet Communists and the KMT entered a prolonged period of alienation. The So-
viet Union and the ROC invariably clashed in the UN, where Moscow consistently and doggedly 
denounced the Taipei authorities, praised and defended Beijing, and waged a struggle for the 
"restoration of the PRC's right" to represent China in this international  body.17 Moscow and 
Taipei repeatedly found themselves confronting each other in the Taiwan straits.18 In July 1954 
Moscow and Taipei became involved in their own bilateral dispute. The Taiwanese authorities 
(under  American  instructions)  seized  the  Soviet  oil  tanker  "Tuapse"  for  violation  of  the 
international  embargo imposed on the PRC during the conflict in  Korea.  The incident was 
followed by the prolonged detention of the vessel and its crew, thereby giving rise to strong anti-
KMT feelings among the Soviet population.19
11 Vorontsov: "Sud’ba kitaiskogo...", op. cit., p. 174.
12 "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya na Dal’nem Vostoke", Moscow, Nauka, 1973, Vol. 2, pp. 159-160.
13 Shijie zhishi, No. 3, 1987, p. 15.
14 E. Bazhanov: "Kitai i vneshnyjie mir", Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1990, p. 36.
15 Shijie zhishi, No. 16, 1983, p. 9.
16 "Sovremenny Kitai", Moscow, Nauka, 1994, pp. 141-143.
17 See M. Kapitsa: "KNR. Tri desyatiletiya - tri politiki", Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 48-50, and 133-143.
18 "Memuary Khrushcheva", in: Voprosy istorii, No. 2, 1993, pp. 80-81.
19 The incident received wide exposure in the USSR through a hit movie "Emergency case". Millions of Soviet 
spectators saw the movie.
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By the end of the 1960s the situation was starting to change. Soviet-Chinese relations had de-
teriorated to such a degree that every foe of Beijing was perceived by Moscow as a potential 
partner in deterring "the Chinese menace". Taiwan was thus quite an attractive proposition for 
Moscow. Among Moscow’s first overtures to Taipei were visits to the island by a notorious So-
viet special agent, Victor Louis. He appeared on Taiwan on a number of occasions between 1968 
and 1970, and-- according to some authors--made quite sensational proposals to the KMT lead-
ership. Louis allegedly discussed the possibility of a Taiwanese invasion of the mainland and the 
restoration of KMT rule there, the provision of Soviet military aid to the ROC, and the possibility 
of setting up an anti-Mao Chinese Communist Party abroad. An exchange of secret information 
on the PRC was also offered and accepted.
This exchange remained active during 1968 and 1969 and only gradually diminished in 1970 
(when the USSR and the PRC agreed to improve bilateral relations).20 Taipei’s enthusiasm for 
developing a dialogue with the Soviets also cooled--partly owing to American pressure and partly 
because of its disappointment with Moscow's behaviour vis-ŕ-vis Taipei and Beijing.21 Foreign 
Minister  Zhou  Shukai  even  lost  his  position  for  advocating  continued  approaches  to  the 
Kremlin.22 However, the two sides, Moscow and Taipei, were still not as hostile to each other as 
they had  been before and  they allowed occasional  contacts  between their  diplomats,  trade 
officials and scholars in third countries, especially at international forums.
1.4 Gorbachev and Taipei
"Perestroika" and "new thinking" in the USSR drastically changed the international environment 
and opened up new opportunities for a warming of Soviet-Taiwanese relations. The winds of 
democratisation in the ROC also facilitated an opening up of contacts with the Soviet Union. In 
Taiwan the initiative came in early 1988 from a private lobbyist group, the Taiwan Provincial 
Union of Export-Import Chambers of Commerce. The Union criticised the government for its 
refusal to liberalise trade with the USSR and embarked upon an active campaign of advertising 
the attractive features of the Soviet market. The Union’s leadership also announced its intention 
to send a delegation to the USSR.23 Finally, in May 1988 the KMT leadership lifted the ban on 
trade with the Soviet Union and gave the green light for the trade delegation's trip to Moscow.24
Nevertheless, Taipei’s approach remained gradual and cautious. The Soviet authorities for their 
part came to the conclusion that initiating commercial contacts with the ROC was desirable. The 
delegation from the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce was given a very friendly reception in the 
USSR.  However,  the  elderly  statesmen of  the  KMT  denounced the  visit  and  accused  the 
government of irresponsibility and lack of vigilance vis-ŕ-vis the enemy. The party leadership 
confirmed its anti-Communist position and consented only to indirect trade with the USSR.25 
Meanwhile, the ranks of businessmen, scholars, government officials and legislators favouring 
the promotion of ties with the Soviet Union continued to grow.26 Given the still existing political 
and ideological differences between Moscow and Taipei, many people demanded that economic 
ties be separated from all other spheres.27
20 Lianhe bao, 22-23 May 1995.
21 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 104.
22 Ziyou shibao, 24 June 1992.
23 Lianhe bao, 25 February 1988.
24 Zhongguo shibao, 14 October 1988.
25 Zhongyang ribao, 20 October 1988.
26 Zhongyang ribao, 13-14, 18 and 20 October 1988.
27 Zhongguo shibao, 30 October 1988.
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The visit of the Taiwanese commercial delegation to the USSR triggered a harsh reaction from 
Beijing. The PRC accused Taipei of pursuing political aims under the guise of trade28 and de-
manded an explanation from the Soviet authorities. The Kremlin, anxious to normalise relations 
with its giant Communist neighbour, decided to slow down the pace of rapprochement with 
Taiwan.29 During Mikhail Gorbachev's historic visit to the PRC in May 1989 the Soviet leader 
reiterated Moscow's support for Beijing's position on Taiwan.30 Nevertheless, contacts between 
the USSR and Taiwan continued to grow since the Kremlin could no longer tightly control the 
external  activities  of  Soviet  organisations.  There  were  reciprocal  visits  by  businessmen, 
journalists,  and  scholars,  not  yet  very  frequent,  but  growing  in  number.  The  further  de-
mocratisation of Soviet society and the end of the Cold War contributed to the transformation of 
Taiwanese perceptions of the USSR and of Taipei's attitude towards bilateral ties with its former 
adversary.
In March 1990 the Taiwanese government allowed direct trade and mutual investments with the 
USSR and simplified visa procedures for the Soviets.31 Businessmen rushed to exploit the new 
opportunities,  sending  missions  to  the  USSR  and  participating  in  exhibitions,  fairs  and 
conferences. The semi-official China External Trade Development Council (CETRA) set up an 
exhibition hall in the Soviet capital, advertising the products of Taiwanese firms. Businessmen 
were joined by various cultural and religious groups, some of which even managed to establish 
permanent offices in Soviet cities. There was a stream of visitors from the USSR to the ROC and 
vice versa. In the course of these contacts quite a few Soviets made extravagant promises to the 
Taiwanese. Some talked  about  massive arms supplies from the  USSR to  the  ROC,  others 
predicted the speedy diplomatic recognition of the island republic. Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov 
offered to establish permanent offices in the Soviet and the ROC capitals, had a meeting with the 
famous Chinese dissident Wuer Kaixi (who had been sentenced in absentia in the PRC) and 
suggested that the next time they shook hands it would be in Beijing.32
The central authorities in Moscow were dismayed by Popov's behaviour since they had never 
approved anything of the sort. But nobody from the ranks of decaying Communist officialdom in 
1990 dared to reprimand the then enormously popular democratic Moscow Mayor Popov for his 
activities and statements on Taiwan. When Communist officials launched an investigation into 
the proposed arms sales to the ROC, they received the following reply from a  high-ranking 
admiral in the Defence Ministry: "Yes, we are planning to sell submarines to the Taiwanese for 
scrap. If the Chinese complain, let them pay a higher price, and we'll sell the submarines to 
them".33
Numerous lobbyist groups emerged in the USSR competing for the monopolisation of ties with 
the ROC. One of these was the Soviet Scientific-Industrial Union, which was packed with former 
officials of the CPSU Central Committee. The Union leaders set up a foundation to control all 
aspects of bilateral Russo-Taiwanese relations, including consular functions. An agreement was 
signed with certain Taiwanese business circles on the establishment of a  Foundation of Far 
Eastern Exchanges. This Foundation was to have branches in the two capitals with former Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as head of the Moscow branch.34 The Kremlin, in an 
28 Dagong bao, 17 October 1988.
29 Lianhe bao, 18 May 1989.
30 Lianhe bao, 19 May 1989.
31 Zhongyang ribao, 17 January 1990.
32 Zhongyang ribao, 29 October 1990.
33 Personal conversation between the admiral and the author who in 1990 held responsibility in the CC of the 
CPSU for relations with China.
34 Zhongyang ribao, 10 September 1991.
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attempt to put matters in order, proposed to the PRC to work out guidelines for Moscow-Taipei 
ties. The idea was to include these guidelines in the communiqué issued following the visit to the 
USSR of CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin, scheduled for May 1991. The Soviet proposal allowed 
non-official commercial, scholarly and cultural ties with Taiwan provided that these did not lead 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations. To support their position the Soviets pointed out that 
most countries of the world maintained such ties with Taiwan (including the USA) and that 
indeed even the PRC was successfully developing economic co-operation with its break-away 
province, that the guidelines would help to prevent any future misunderstandings between the 
USSR and the PRC regarding Taiwan, and that the Soviet side would know clearly what was 
acceptable and what not in its ties with the island.
The Chinese strongly objected to the Soviet proposal, advancing several counter arguments. They 
pointed out firstly that there was a universal tendency towards a reduction in the level of relations 
with the KMT authorities: the United States, for example, while historically an ally of Taipei, 
had step by step set about dismantling its collaboration with the KMT; the USSR, by contrast, 
was now talking about upgrading its relationship with Taipei. Secondly, the Soviet Union, as the 
motherland of socialism, had always supported the PRC on the Taiwan issue and had a duty to 
continue this support for ideological reasons. Thirdly, given that the USSR was a great power 
and a very influential country in international affairs, a decision by Moscow to upgrade ties with 
Taipei would give the wrong signal to other countries and have a negative effect on Chinese 
interests.35 In the end the Soviet side agreed to drop the clause on the development of relations 
with Taiwan and the Chinese side promised in return to "close one eye" to contacts between 
Moscow and Taipei.36
Since a clearly defined framework for ties with Taipei had still not been established problems 
continued to crop up. During the spring and summer of 1991 some Taiwanese officials were 
denied Soviet visas or were mistreated by the immigration authorities at Moscow airport. Taiwan 
reacted very negatively to the criticism of "flexible diplomacy" that was included in the Joint 
Communiqué issued following Jiang Zemin’s visit to Moscow in May 1991. Taipei was also 
worried about rumours that Moscow had agreed to supply the PRC with 2000 "SU-27"-fighters. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan continued to push its strategy of rapprochement with the USSR.37
2. The New Russia and Taiwan: the Foundations for Relations
2.1 The formation of a new Russian foreign policy. Moscow vis-ŕ-vis Beijing and Taipei
Russia's policies in 1992 can be described as a balancing act aimed at helping the country to 
survive and overcome its internal dramas.38 And yet it was evident that the new government was 
nevertheless focusing its attention on the West.39 Asia was half-forgotten. Moreover, there was a 
general  feeling that  the  problem with  Russia  was  that  it  was  too  Asian.  China  was  both 
Communist and Asian, the worst possible combination for the Westerners in the new Moscow 
leadership. China was especially despised because of the Tiananmen massacre of democrats in 
35 Working documents of the International Department of the CC of the CPSU, March-April 1991.
36 Zhongyang ribao, 30 May 1991.
37 Zhongyang ribao, 6 March 1992.
38 For details see E. Bazhanov and N. Bazhanova: "Russia and Asia in 1992: A Balancing Act", in: Asian Sur-
vey, Vol. 33, No. 1, January 1993.
39 For details on this subject see E. Bazhanov: "Diplomata vsyaky mozhet obidet'", in: Segodnya, 23 June 1995 
and "Kogda rodina ne v opasnosti", in: Novoe vremya, No. 31, 1995.
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1989 and Beijing's support for the pro-Communist coup in Moscow in August 1991.40 Beijing, in 
turn, was shocked at the turn of events in "the Motherland of Lenin". Among other things Beijing 
suspected that the Yeltsin government would switch its allegiance to Taiwan.41
These fears were not unfounded:. Russia's interest in Taiwan was growing for a  number of 
reasons. Firstly, Russia was impressed by the fact that Taiwan had become by all standards one 
of the richest countries in the world, having accumulated 90 billion US-$, more than any other 
state.42 The economic success of Taiwan was praised by the Russian president himself at, of all 
places, a press conference in Beijing (!).43 It was underlined that the economies of Russia and 
Taiwan were complementary: Russia had rich natural resources which Taiwan needed; Russia 
possessed a qualified and cheap work force while Taiwan had a labour shortage; the Russian 
military-industrial complex was in decline while Taipei was interested in purchasing new ar-
maments and space technology.44 Taiwan was also seen as "a springboard for Russia's leap into 
the vigorously developing Asia-Pacific region, which has great  potential  in  the approaching 
XXIst century".45 Some people in Moscow even urged that  Taiwan should replace Japan as 
Russia's chief economic partner in Asia.46 These high hopes were spurred further by energetic 
efforts on the part of the Taiwanese, who promised economic co-operation and aid and did not 
stop short of bribing influential Russians. As a result, a powerful lobby of high-up government 
functionaries and businessmen emerged with strong personal interests in Taiwan.
This lobby was spearheaded by Oleg Lobov, an aide of President Yeltsin who later became 
secretary of Russia's National Security Council. He and his cohorts hoped to reap a rich harvest 
of lucrative contracts on the island, and pushed Moscow into closer links with the ROC, disre-
garding the reactions of both Beijing and the Russian Foreign Ministry.47 Other powerful groups 
in Russia's leading circles had similar goals. They made what some scholars considered to be 
completely overblown claims about  the Taiwanese market:  in  other words the prospects for 
economic co-operation between the ROC and Russia were grossly exaggerated.48
Secondly, Russian enthusiasm for closer ties with Taiwan was motivated by a number of ideo-
logical and political factors. The new Russia was moved by the similarity of its ideological val-
ues to those of the ROC, by Taiwanese support for the Russian reforms, and by the conviction 
that  China's future belonged to the KMT's philosophy and policies. The Russian newspaper 
Izvestia wrote on the 100th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth: "Simultaneously with a pseudo-
revolution on the mainland a real positive revolution was taking place in Taiwan ... At the time 
of Mao Zedong's death in 1976 everything was more than clear: a prosperous Taiwan with high 
levels of income convincingly demonstrated what a real revolution was".49 Having called Sun 
Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek two truly great revolutionaries of China, Izvestia concluded: "It is 
40 Vserossiisky  tsentr  po  khraneniyu  sovremennoi  dokumentatsii  (VTsKhSD),  archive  8,  list  6,  file 
116, pp. 49-50.
41 The New York Times, 8 September 1992. For more details on Russo-Chinese relations in 1991-1992, see 
E. Bazhanov: "Russian Policy toward China" in Peter Shearman (Ed.): "Russian Foreign Policy since 1990", 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1995, pp. 159-164.
42 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 18.
43 Zhongyang ribao, 12 December 1992.
44 O. Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor v sovremennoy mezhdunarodnoy obstanovke i rossiiskie interesy", Moscow, 
Diplomaticheskaya Akademiya, 1993, pp. 30-31.
45 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 17.
46 Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor...", op. cit., p. 33.
47 Lobov's group was also involved in many other adventures,  including the introduction into Russia of the 
notorious Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo.
48 "Taivan' v politike Rossii", Moscow, Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, 1992, p. 16.
49 Izvestiya, 4 January 1994.
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obvious now that all of China is moving in this direction, prescribed by the Kuomintang. Sooner 
or  later  the  Communist  ideological  system will  collapse  on  the  mainland  (gradually  and 
peacefully or  abruptly and violently)  and the KMT philosophy will  rule  over the whole of 
China".50 Scholars echoed these sentiments by predicting that mainland China sooner or later 
would have to modernise its political regime and then Taiwan's experience would be of value.51
Thirdly, Taiwan was seen as a model of development for Russia. There were persistent calls "to 
study the story of Taiwanese success with utmost care and learn from the KMT experience".52 
Moscow Times, for example, insisted that Russia should copy Taiwanese land reforms, its ex-
port-oriented industries, its state control over basic branches of the economy, its maintenance of 
social and political stability, and the choice of the correct economic strategy by the government.53
Fourthly, some external factors contributed to this line of thinking. The Russians noted a boom in 
economic, academic and cultural exchanges between the PRC itself and Taiwan, calling this "an 
important lesson of behaviour".54 It was regularly stressed that a dialogue with Taipei would not 
in any way harm the PRC or Moscow-Beijing relations.55 The argument was advanced that 
Russia should not have lagged behind the USA in maintaining ties with Taiwan. At the Russian 
parliamentary hearings on April 25, 1994 it was stressed: "Russia is no less a sovereign state than 
the United States. And there are no longer any political or ideological barriers dividing Russia 
and the Republic of China. We should proceed by deepening and widening the scope of our co-
operation with Taiwan".56 Among the positive results of the rapprochement with the ROC were 
mentioned "the sympathy of the USA, Japan and other Western countries, as well as of anti-
Communist Chinese in the PRC and all over the world".57
Last, but not least, some internal factors should be mentioned. A cultural interest in Taiwan was 
discernible , especially in the intellectual circles of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok and the 
Urals region.58 Russian scholars and journalists openly admitted that their views of the ROC had 
in the past been "unprofessional", that they "had not understood" Taiwan.59 Now many wanted to 
try the previously forbidden exotic fruit. There were also forces pushing for closer relations with 
the ROC for publicity purposes. The extremist Liberal-Democratic Party, headed by Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky,  pedalled the concept of "two Chinas" in order  to  gain media  attention and to 
challenge the Kremlin.60
2.2 Taipei's hopes in Russia
The collapse of the Communist system in the USSR followed by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union gave rise to a mood of euphoria and quite unrealistic hopes in the ROC. Leading officials 
and parliamentarians of the island set themselves the goal of achieving diplomatic relations with 
Russia  and the other  former  republics of the  defunct  USSR through various measures and 
methods such as aid, investments, educational and cultural links, the cultivation of influential 
50 Ibid.
51 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 90.
52 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 18.
53 Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor...", op. cit., p. 34.
54 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 18.
55 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 7.
56 Hearings on China, Russian State Duma, Moscow, State Duma Press office, April 1994.
57 "Taivan' v politike Rossii...", op. cit., p. 19.
58 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., pp. 85-87.
59 Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor...", op. cit., p. 27.
60 Hearings on China..., op. cit.
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people and the forging of close ties with them etc.61 Pressure was exerted on the Foreign Ministry 
to  put  the plan  into practice.62 Taipei  tried hard  to  gain the sympathy of the new Russian 
authorities before Beijing could make a move.63 Moreover, Taiwanese representatives continued 
to declare that they valued the Russian connection as an important element in strengthening the 
ROC's international position, that they wanted to have "independent" relations with as many 
foreign states as possible and to be represented in all important international organisations.64
At the same time, it was invariably stressed that Taipei appreciated the importance of the PRC 
for Russia and did not intend in any way to undermine Moscow-Beijing ties.65 In reality, of 
course, Taipei hoped that the new anti-Communist Russia would play an instrumental role in the 
gradual demise of Communist rule in mainland China. No other country, from the Taiwanese 
point of view, could influence the PRC more than the cradle of world communism itself, which 
had now rejected Marxism-Leninism.66 There were also economic incentives for Taipei in its 
emerging relations with Russia. As the general secretary of the International Trade Association of 
the ROC, Han Songlin, put it: "We strive to co-operate with other countries, especially with such 
a great country as Russia, which has an enormous market. Its people is one of the most educated 
and talented in the world. Russia's potential is enormous. We don't have the resources that you 
have. Now we not only want to open the Russian market for ourselves in order to sell our 
products, but we want mutual co-operation, importing Russian products".67
2.3 The conservative shift in Russia and its repercussions in Asia
Meanwhile, the Russian internal situation and consequently Moscow's foreign policy began to 
change. It became less pro-Western, less ideological (democratic), more pragmatic, nationalistic, 
great-power  oriented.68 Powerful  motives  -  security,  strategic,  economic,  cultural  -  pushed 
Moscow to pay more attention to the Asia-Pacific region.69 The PRC occupied a central place in 
the Kremlin's renewed interest in Asia. Beijing, in turn, drastically changed its attitude towards 
Russia  under  equally  forceful  imperatives.70 Russo-Chinese  relations  started  to  improve, 
gradually but consistently, and they are now described by both sides as "excellent", "successful", 
"stable", "friendly", etc.71 President Yeltsin nowadays calls the PRC "the most important partner 
of  Russia  in  the  world".72 As  a  result,  the  comparative  importance  of  Taiwan  for  Russia 
diminished. Any illusions entertained by Moscow that China would soon be united on the basis of 
the KMT model disappeared.73
61 Zhongyang ribao, 22 August and 6 September 1991.
62 Zhongyang ribao, 14 September and 29 November 1991.
63 "Taivan' v politike Rossii...", op. cit., pp. 6-10.
64 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 11.
65 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 12.
66 "Taivan' v politike Rossii...", op. cit., pp. 3-4.
67 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 41.
68 For details of this analysis see E. Bazhanov: "Moscow's Hardline Shift", Moscow Times, 25 August 1995 and 
"Top Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy", in: New Times, October 1995, pp. 32-34.
69 For details see E. Bazhanov and N. Bazhanova: "Russia and Asia in 1993", in: Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 1, 
January 1994, pp. 87-97; E. Bazhanov: "Russia Looks to the East", in: Moscow Times, 15 September 1995.
70 For details see E. Bazhanov: "Russian Policy toward China", op. cit., pp. 167-169.
71 E.  Bazhanov:  "Russian  Policy toward  China",  op.  cit.,  pp. 169-178.  "Russian-Chinese  Relations",  press 
release, Moscow, Foreign Ministry of Russia, January 1996.
72 Izvestiya, 20 November 1995.
73 Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 5, 1993, pp. 44-151. Rossiiskaya gazeta, 15 October 1995.
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Under the changed circumstances both Russian officials and the media have begun to admit that 
"nobody wants a confrontation with Beijing. Communist China is too big, too influential to be 
challenged because of Taiwan".74 There is  a  consensus in  Russian society that  unrestrained 
friendship with Taipei might undermine Russo-Chinese relations, stir up Beijing's hostility to-
wards Moscow, and lead to Russia's being perceived in the PRC as an enemy of the Chinese 
nation.75 Likewise, Russian ideological identity with "democratic Taiwan" has evaporated from a 
now much more conservative Russian society (for the Russian Communists, who are regaining 
strength, mainland China is the more attractive society).  Consequently,  the fact  that  Taipei 
supports Russian reforms is no longer valued as much in Russia (Beijing after all does not oppose 
these  reforms either).  The  Taiwanese  model  of  development  has  lost  most  of  its  appeal, 
overshadowed as it is by the example of Communist China. Appeals to learn from Taiwan are 
scarcely to be heard any more (while appeals to draw on the PRC's experience and lessons are 
becoming louder).
In fact, the Communist press has on a number of occasions attacked the KMT for its "bad" 
historical record (oppression at home, anti-PRC posture, "subservience" to Washington, etc.).76 
Some conservative, nationalist circles claim that the Taiwanese provide a bad example to separa-
tists in Russia, especially the Chechens.77 Communists in general are displaying an increasingly 
unfriendly attitude towards "capitalist, "pro-Western" Taiwan. They categorically oppose arms 
sales to the ROC, have ridiculed Lee Teng-hui's pretension's to being "President of the Republic 
of China", denounced "a pompous reception" for Gorbachev in Taiwan, etc.78 Economically, co-
operation with the ROC has proved to be much less fruitful than originally expected. The volume 
of trade is considerably smaller than that between Moscow and Beijing. In many cases Russian 
importers prefer mainland products since they are cheaper and more suited to Russian tastes.
As it developed, competition among rival groups of the Taiwan lobby also became a stumbling 
block in the way of Russo-Taiwanese co-operation. This issue will be discussed in detail in part 3 
of this study. Here we would simply like to mention the fact that one powerful lobbyist group, 
having failed to gain control of the prospective Russian unofficial mission in Taipei, decided to 
try to prevent the opening of such a mission altogether (so far these efforts have been successful, 
with negative consequences s for Russo-Taiwanese ties). The Taiwanese have reduced the level 
of bribery of Russian officials and as a  result,  the pro-Taiwan lobby in Russia has shrunk. 
Nonetheless, a reduction in Russia's interest in Taiwan does not mean that it no longer exists. 
Indeed, there is still quite a strong interest in allowing slow, but gradual progress in relations 
between Moscow and Taipei. Taipei, for its part, has come to the conclusion that Russia is not a 
very promising political partner since it will not do anything that might jeopardise its relations 
with Beijing. Not only will Moscow not agree to anything resembling official ties with the ROC, 
it will not support Taipei's drive to obtain a seat in the United Nations either. Moreover, Moscow 
tends to sympathise with Beijing on most international problems and supplies it with advanced 
weapons.79 Hopes of lucrative economic co-operation with Russia have also subsided (these issues 
will be discussed in more detail below).
74 Trud, 26 December 1993.
75 "Russia and Asia", proceedings of a seminar, Moscow, The Diplomatic Academy, pp. 18-19.
76 See, for example, Pravda, 10 August 1995 and Patriot, 15 January 1996.
77 Zavtra, 26 May 1995.
78 See Pravda, 26 December 1992 and 31 March 1994
79 See Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor...", op. cit., pp. 40-41 and ITAR-TASS, "AK"24, 21 July 1993.
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3. The Dynamics of Russo-Taiwanese Relations
3.1 Legal framework
The first steps towards laying a legal foundation for Soviet-Taiwanese relations were taken in 
1991. Negotiations were held on establishing air and maritime links as well as on normalising 
bank exchanges and providing a favourable tax regime for the exchange of goods. One concrete 
result of these efforts was the inclusion of Taiwanese goods in the same category as those of the 
PRC.  This  could  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  treat  Taiwan  as  subordinate  to  Beijing's 
authority, but it nevertheless facilitated trade. After the dissolution of the USSR in December 
1991 negotiations on legal issues intensified. As a carrot for Moscow, the Taiwanese government 
held out the prospect of generous humanitarian aid and promised investments in the Russian 
economy.  In  February  1992  Deputy  Foreign Minister  Chang Hsiao-yen went  to  Russia  to 
negotiate the agreement and met with Yeltsin's aide Lobov. Lobov, who did not hold any high 
post in the Kremlin at the time, showed keen interest in the promotion of Russo-Taiwanese ties 
and managed to achieve tangible progress. As a result of the meetings between Chang and Lobov 
a skeleton protocol was successfully negotiated and. was signed during the Taiwanese diplomat's 
second visit to Moscow on April 16, 1992. The two sides agreed to set up a Moscow-Taipei and 
Taipei-Moscow "Economic and Cultural Co-operation Co-ordination Commission" (MTC and 
TMC).  These commissions were identified as  "non-governmental,  non-profit  instruments" to 
promote ties in various non-political spheres. The two sides agreed to open permanent missions in 
Moscow and Taipei. The document stipulated that the commissions would be empowered with 
the prerogatives "usually granted to governmental officials".80 It was also stressed in the protocol 
that the MTC and TMC would do their best to obtain the approval of their governments by the 
end of May 1992.
On September 2, 1992 President Yeltsin officially approved the creation of the MTC, giving it 
vast powers. This gave rise to speculation in the ROC that Moscow and Taipei would establish 
ties akin to diplomatic relations, similar to those between the USA and Taiwan. Lobov confirmed 
in an interview that the MTC and TMC missions would have privileges of a diplomatic nature. 
He also stressed that visa and transportation problems would be resolved in the near future.81 In 
mid- September,  1992  Lobov arrived in  Taipei  with a  high-level  delegation.  There he and 
Deputy Foreign Minister Chang signed "a series of documents establishing representative offices 
quasi-official in their status, responsible for issuing visas and supervising bilateral relations".82
These developments prompted a  strong reaction on the part  of Beijing, which demanded an 
explanation of the Russian stance on Taiwan. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev apologised to the 
Chinese ambassador.83 He and influential figures in the Kremlin, critical of Lobov, persuaded 
Yeltsin to restrain his aide, whose flirting with Taipei, they said, had begun to damage Russo-
Chinese relations. The result was a decree issued by the Russian president on September 15, 
1992, entitled "On relations between the Russian Federation and Taiwan". The decree said:
In relations with Taiwan the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that there is only one China. The 
government of the People's Republic of China is  the sole legal government, representing the whole of 
China. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Russian Federation does not maintain official inter-
state relations with Taiwan. Economic, scientific, cultural and other unofficial ties between Russia and 
80 "Treaties between the ROC and Foreign States", Vol. 9 (1991-1992), Taipei, 1994, p. 236.
81 Izvestiya, 10 September 1992.
82 Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor...", op. cit., pp. 16-17.
83 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 September 1992.
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Taiwan are executed by individual citizens and non-governmental organisations, empowered with func-
tions necessary for legal, technical and other provision of these ties, and the protection of Russian citizens' 
rights in Taiwan. These ties are regulated by appropriate legal acts of the Russian Federation.
All  possible  representative offices  of  Russian  organisations  in  Taiwan and  accordingly of  Taiwan in 
Russia are non-governmental establishments and cannot pretend to have the status, authority, privileges or 
benefits typical of state organs. Their legal basis is determined by local legislation. Persons employed in 
the civil service cannot  work as employees of the non-governmental  organisations  and establishments 
executing ties with Taiwan. Neither Russia's state symbols and symbols of "the Republic of China" nor the 
name  "Republic  of  China"  may be  used  in  Russo-Taiwanese  contacts,  agreements,  or  documents. 
Taiwanese partners cannot use them on Russian territory. Other possible options are "Taiwan, China" or 
"Taipei, China". Travel documents of Russian citizens and organisations for visits to Taiwan and of in-
habitants of Taiwan for visits to Russia are to be issued with the assistance of consular divisions of em-
bassies of the Russian Federation in third countries and non-governmental organisations in Moscow and 
Taipei.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is empowered to control the implementation of 
the provisions of this Decree. The ministry is entitled to request the government of the Russian Federation 
to  terminate  the  activities  of  organisations  created  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this  Decree, 
notwithstanding the dates of their  registration.  The ministry may also request  administrative measures 
against officials violating the provisions of this Decree.[...]84
The decree stated further that Moscow would presently refrain from opening permanent repre-
sentative offices of the Moscow-Taipei Co-ordination Commission in Moscow and Taipei until 
new instructions were given and that the composition of the Russian side of the commission, its 
functions and the dates of opening representative offices would be determined with the approval 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
In addition to this Decree the Russian government also consented to follow in its relations with 
Taiwan an agreement reached in the autumn of 1992  with Beijing. Moscow undertook the 
following obligations: 1) to refrain from having contacts with Taipei at a level higher than deputy 
ministers; 2) to rule out any possibility of military ties with the ROC; and 3) not to allow the use 
of state symbols in any contacts with Taiwan, including air,  maritime and other links.85 The 
Russian  media  endorsed Yeltsin's decree on Taiwan  denouncing Lobov and  his  people for 
irresponsible statements and actions that had unduly infuriated Beijing.86 In the aftermath of the 
decree the composition of the MTC Board was reconsidered and high-up officials from leading 
ministries were dropped from the roster  of its  members. On April  15,  1993  the MTC was 
registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice87 and in August it opened an office in Moscow. The 
TMC had opened a permanent mission in the Russian capital on July 12, 1993, but this had not 
been endowed with official status by the Russian government.
So far there has been no further development of a legal framework for Russo-Taiwanese links. 
Some attempts have been made to negotiate air service, maritime, tourist, trade and taxation 
agreements, but to no avail. In December 1992, Moscow and Beijing confirmed their previous 
positions on Taiwan and Russia's scope of relations with the island. These positions were fixed in 
the "Joint Declaration on the Foundations of Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
People's Republic of China".88 This did not, however, stop the Taiwanese from engaging in 
further attempts to persuade their Russian partners to upgrade mutual ties in one way or an-
84 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 15 September 1992, N 1072, Moscow, press release.
85 Izvestiya, 16 October 1992.
86 Izvestiya, 17 September 1994.
87 Zhongguo shibao, 16 April 1993.
88 See Diplomatichesky Vestnik, No. 1-2, January 1993, p. 13.
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other.89 Specifically, the Taiwanese insisted that in relations between Moscow and Taipei the 
American formula should be adopted as "the most appropriate and sensible" They proposed that 
the two sides should sign a  bilateral  agreement on various issues and  freely participate  in 
multinational agreements. In addition, aeroplanes with state symbols should fly between the two 
countries; the two sides should exchange missions equal in their status to full diplomatic ones; 
national flags, symbols, and titles should be freely used; and legal protection should be accorded 
to all participants in bilateral exchanges etc.90
Often Taiwanese pressure on Moscow was of a  rather practical  nature.  For example, when 
offering humanitarian aid to Russia, Taipei strongly insisted that this aid should come under the 
flag of the ROC and that every element of it should carry official symbols. Taipei also demanded 
that  Taiwanese  ships  be  allowed  into  Russian  ports  under  the  ROC's  flag.  Taiwanese 
representatives explained to Russian business groups that they could not expect any profitable 
deals with Taiwan unless the ROC had an official embassy-level office in Moscow. Taipei sensed 
that the Russian government was divided over the issue of relations with the ROC and sought to 
exploit this situation. By 1994, however, the Taiwanese had realised that there was no more to be 
achieved; . they stopped pressuring Moscow on fundamental issues, admitting that "Beijing had 
used historical foundations to promote relations with Russia".91
In conclusion, it should be noted that the legal foundations of Russo-Taiwanese relations still 
need much improvement. The two sides must provide a legal framework for trade, investments, 
and cultural exchanges if relations in these areas are to develop freely, quickly and smoothly.
3.2 Political dimensions
During the final months of the USSR's existence important Soviet representatives paid their first 
visits to the ROC. In October 1991 the President of the USSR Central Bank Viktor Gerashenko 
met with members of the ROC cabinet.92 In November the then Minister of Light Industry, A. 
Shumeiko, stressed during a visit to Taiwan that Yeltsin valued highly the Taiwanese experience 
of economic development and was eager to promote ties with the island.93 A number of prominent 
Taiwanese visited Russia and held talks with government officials and political parties. At the 
end of 1991 a delegation of Taiwanese politicians and businessmen was received by Yeltsin's 
chief of staff Yurii Petrov. He assured the guests of Moscow’s strong interest in developing ties 
with Taipei.  In 1992  Lobov's group, which enjoyed the patronage of the Russian president, 
gained almost complete control over ties with Taiwan. After being criticised by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry and denounced by the media for various machinations, Lobov distanced himself 
from Taiwan and from the activities of the MTC. This change in tack was also prompted by the 
appointment of Lobov to the National Security Council. Lobov resigned from the MTC, and no 
new head was appointed (Zapalsky, an aide of Lobov’s, is acting head of the MTC).
For a while the MTC co-operated with the Russian Foreign Ministry on opening a permanent 
representative office in Taipei. However, the MTC failed to get sufficient funds for the mission 
from the government. Moreover, the members of the MTC realised that the Russian Foreign 
Ministry intended to keep a firm grip on the mission. Subsequently, Zapalsky and his cohorts lost 
interest  in  co-sponsoring  the  project:  apart  from anything  else  they  realised  that  Russian 
89 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., pp. 78-79.
90 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., pp. 25-27.
91 Zhongyang ribao, 4 February 1994.
92 Zhongyang ribao, 19 October 1991.
93 Zhongyang ribao, 26 November 1991.
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diplomats were likely to keep a watchful eye on the commercial activities of MTC businessmen. 
Thus, the whole enterprise of setting up a representative office in Taiwan under the name of 
MTC fell into the hands of the Foreign Ministry.  An experienced Russian diplomat of am-
bassadorial rank was slated to be head of the office and was assigned a number of deputies. All of 
them ought to have resigned from the ministry for the duration of their term in Taiwan. And yet 
by the beginning of 1996 the mission had still not been opened. The Foreign Ministry repeatedly 
tried to obtain the official approval of the prime minister for the opening, but in vain. By way of 
explanation the Russian diplomats hear references to the China factor and the importance of 
keeping Beijing happy. The real reason though, as might be suspected, has been the behind-the-
scenes activities of the MTC group which did not wish to see foreign ministry officials (together 
with intelligence people etc.)  stationed in Taiwan. Thus, the MTC and the Russian Foreign 
Ministry have traded roles: now it is the ministry that is pushing ahead in relations with Taiwan, 
so far not very effectively. In Moscow, too, it is the Foreign Ministry that maintains contacts with 
the TMC and the CETRA offices and provides them with assistance. The MTC, on the other 
hand,  plays  a  diminishing role  in  Russo-Taiwanese ties  and  has  lost  prestige and  trust  in 
Taiwan.94
There are, however, other political forces in Russia that have shown an inclination to promote 
ties with Taipei. In March 1994 Vladimir Zhirinovsky extended an invitation to ROC President 
Lee Teng-hui to participate in the Russian Liberal-Democratic Party Congress and to make a 
speech before  the  Russian  parliament  (in  a  private  capacity).  The  Taiwanese  media  gave 
prominent coverage to Zhirinovsky's overtures calling him one of the most prominent Russian 
politicians and the LDPR the biggest party in Russia. Zhirinovsky put pressure on the Foreign 
Ministry to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa, but as it turned out Taipei did not in any case accept the 
invitation.95 Over time the Taiwanese became wiser and realised that Zhirinovsky was not the 
man they should be dealing with. A number of articles denouncing Zhirinovsky as an eccentric 
extremist appeared in Taiwanese newspapers.96
Of greater significance may be contacts between the Russian parliament and leading Taiwanese 
political circles initiated in 1994 by a prominent member of the State Duma, Nikolai Stolyarov. 
During 1994 and 1995 there were a number of reciprocal visits, involving top legislators of both 
sides. In August 1994 the World League for Freedom and Democracy, the former World Anti-
Communist League, held an international conference in Moscow, in which legislators and other 
politicians  of  the  ROC  and  the  RF  participated.97 A  Russian  division  of  the  League  was 
established headed by former Moscow Mayor Popov. In October the speaker of the State Duma, 
Ivan Rybkin,  received a  high-ranking Taiwanese delegation and discussed the promotion of 
bilateral  relations.98 In  April  1995  Stolyarov  led  an  impressive  delegation of  CIS  officials 
(including the Russian minister of justice, the deputy mayor of Moscow etc.) to Taiwan. The 
visitors had talks with President Lee Teng-hui, the foreign minister and other officials.99 Some 
deputies of the new Russian parliament, elected in December 1995, are also keen on developing 
ties with Taiwan. Among the four parties represented in the parliament the most active in this 
94 The head of the TMC in Moscow, Lo Loon, complains that since his arrival in Moscow almost three years ago 
Lobov has never received him. Lo Loon dismisses the MTC as a group of businessmen, who neither want nor 
can do much for Russo-Taiwanese relations.
95 Lianhe bao, 15 March 1994. The Taiwanese foreign minister said that there was no time "to properly prepare 
the visit" and that he doubted that Zhirinovsky would be able to guarantee an adequate level of reception for 
the president (Lianhe bao, 16 March 1994).
96 See Zhongyang ribao, 12 January 1994.
97 Zhongyang ribao, 12 August, 1994.
98 Zhongyang ribao, 20 October 1994
99 Zhongyang ribao, 27 April 1995.
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respect is still Zhirinovsky's LDPR. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's party "Our Home Is 
Russia" and Yavlinsky's "Yabloko" are more cautious. As for the Communist Party, although it 
tends to associate itself with Beijing, some of its parliamentary representatives are nevertheless 
pursuing active contacts with Taiwan (chiefly for reasons of personal gain).
Outside the parliament a no lesser figure than Mikhail Gorbachev visited the ROC in March 
1994.100 There were also visits by the military - the former commander-in-chief of the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet Admiral Vladimir Sidorov and Vice-Admiral A. Styrov, and a number of repre-
sentatives of the military-industrial complex anxious to sell weapons to Taiwan. Sidorov met 
with the Taiwanese prime minister and all  the country's top military officials, including the 
defence minister and the chief of the general staff. Before his departure the Soviet admiral praised 
the economic and political achievements of the ROC as well as the "capacity of the Republic of 
China to defend itself by military means".101 Sidorov described current ties between Russia and 
Taiwan as "only the beginning" and called upon the Taiwanese "to help rescue the Russian 
economy".102
Though commercial in nature, such plans could create a new political situation in Russo-Tai-
wanese relations. However, Taipei refused to buy Russian weapons. On the Taiwanese side a 
number of lobbyist groups, for example, the Sino-Russian Association for International  Hu-
manitarian Dialogue, attempted to push relations with Moscow beyond logical limits. There were 
plans to lure top officials of Russia to the ROC, to initiate arms trade etc. Yet, on the whole 
relations remained within the former political framework. There were no forces in Russia (except 
for a number of individual scholars) really anxious to promote diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 
to help Taiwan to obtain an independent status, or to facilitate Taiwan's entry into the United 
Nations. If statements of this sort were sometimes heard, they were the products of ignorance, 
negligence or commercial interests rather than a reflection of serious political positions. In 1994 
Chechnya  became the first  issue to  cloud Russia's  image in  the  minds of some Taiwanese 
politicians. Representatives of the DPP opposition in the ROC parliament condemned Moscow's 
"aggression" against Chechnya. The DPP repeatedly demanded the "freezing" of relations with 
Russia, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Chechnya, and the extension of humanitarian 
aid  to  it.  The  DPP claimed that  Taiwan  faced the same danger from the PRC if  it  chose 
independence.
3.3 Economics
Experts both in Russia and Taiwan agree that there is great potential for the development of trade 
and economic co-operation between the two sides. Some even suggest that Taiwan can become 
one  of  Russia's  leading  partners  in  South-East  Asia.  Such  conclusions  are  based  on  the 
assumption that the economies of the two states are highly complementary. Russia urgently needs 
what the ROC has in abundance: the electronics, light, textile, and wood-processing industries 
and  the  experience  of  fast  and  successful  economic  development,  including  a  strategy  of 
promotion of small and medium-sized companies. Taiwan, in turn, is attracted by the prospect of 
receiving Russian raw materials and various unique technologies that were previously used in the 
military sector. Among the areas of economic co-operation identified by both sides as promising, 
may be mentioned Russian energy resources, timber, the conversion of military industries and 
100 Gorbachev's visit had an extraordinary impact in Taiwan. The local media stressed that  "the presence of a 
political figure of world stature will help to strengthen Taiwan's position on the planet" (see Lianhe bao, 23 
March 1994).
101 Vaskov: "Taivan'sky faktor...", op. cit., pp. 44-45.
102 Ibid.
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scientific achievements.103 Russian economists and industrialists have repeatedly offered to their 
Taiwanese counterparts thousands of Russian hi-tech products which could be produced with 
Taiwanese money in  Russia  or  better  still  in  Taiwan  itself  (superclean  materials,  artificial 
diamonds, artificial intelligence, special metals etc.).104
In the early 1990s certain steps were taken to promote economic links between Russia and 
Taiwan. In February 1990 the Taiwanese authorities removed restrictions on direct trade with 
Russia. Since 1991 a representative office of CETRA has been functioning in Moscow under the 
name  "Taipei  World  Trade  Center".  CETRA  is  a  non-commercial  organisation  providing 
information and consulting services to Taiwanese and Russian businessmen. CETRA's Moscow 
office also organises international conferences on Taiwan in Russia. Since 1994 there have been 
ten exhibitions of Taiwanese goods in Russia organised with the assistance of the Taipei World 
Trade Center.105 As already mentioned, in 1992 Russia extended its preferential treatment of PRC 
goods to  trade  with  the  ROC.  Taipei  reciprocated in  January  1994  with  the  extension of 
preferential import duties for Russian goods. Russian businessmen can now get a Taiwanese visa 
in Moscow within a  week. Telephone and fax lines between Russia and Taiwan have been 
installed. There are no longer difficulties with the registration of Taiwanese firms in Russia. Thus 
, step by step the foundations for trade and economic relations between Russia and Taiwan have 
been laid.
Trade is the most dynamic element of bilateral  economic co-operation between Moscow and 
Taipei,  showing steady growth. In 1989  bilateral  trade totalled 75  million US$, in 1990  it 
reached 119 million US-$ and then grew each year by an average of over 60%, as can be seen 
from Table 1. The ROC has become the fourth largest trading partner of Russia in the Asia-
Pacific region behind the PRC, Japan and South Korea. At the same time it should be noted that 
the volume of this trade is still limited. Thus, it amounts to less than 1% of the overall foreign 
trade volume of the ROC.
103 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 8.
104 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., pp. 34-39.
105 Moskovsky Komsomolets, 1 March 1996.
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Table 1
Trade between Taiwan and Russia (in millions US-$)106
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Export 85 23 73 164 174 
rate of growth (%) -73 +217 +83 +6
Import 128 345 641 1,097 1,628
rate of growth (%) +169 +85 +71 +48
Total 213 368 714 1,261 1,802
rate of growth (%) +73 +94 +77 +43
An important feature of Russo-Taiwanese trade is a stable and huge surplus in favour of Russia 
(almost 1,500 million US-$ in 1995). This fact is explained by the great interest of Taiwanese 
firms in cheap Russian raw materials. Russia has become one of the main suppliers of steel and 
cotton to the island. It  has also exported magnesium, coal,  unwrought aluminium, zinc and 
nickel, gold, iron, and synthetic rubber to the ROC. Many of these products are supplied to 
Taiwanese importers below the market price.107 It looks as though exports of metals from Russia 
to Taiwan will continue to grow. The largest Taiwanese state company, China Steel Corporation, 
has signed a  long-term contract with the Magnitogorsk metallurgy enterprise to finance the 
modernisation of the enterprise and the purchase of its steel products.108 As for Russian imports 
from the ROC these are  still  quite limited. The reason has been the high prices. However, 
Taiwanese computers and parts find a good response among Russian customers. According to 
experts' estimates up to 80% of the personal computers now in use in Russia, are of Taiwanese 
origin. Taiwanese TV electronic games also dominate the Russian market.109 It should be added 
that  customs statistics do  not  take  into  account  transactions made  through third  countries, 
including exports to Russia of goods produced at Taiwanese enterprises abroad (in the PRC, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong etc.). According to some estimates, products originating in 
Taiwanese firms constitute 11% of the overall exports of the PRC and 37% of its exports of 
electronics.110
Initially there was much talk about sales of Russian arms to Taipei. Taiwan seemed to be a very 
attractive customer because it was rich and concerned with upgrading its defence capabilities. 
Expectations were enhanced by the wave of euphoria on this account in Taiwan. Various ar-
guments were advanced in favour of importing Russian weapons: some thought it would tie 
Russia to Taipei and slow down rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing; others were eager 
to learn more about Russian weapons since they were used by the PRC. Moreover, the prices for 
Russian arms were attractive, the diversification of sources of arms supplies seemed logical, and 
it was thought that the news of Russo-Taiwanese military ties might make the Americans more 
flexible in providing advanced weapons to the island (especially F-16  fighters).  In the end, 
however,  both  Taipei  and  Moscow repudiated  arms  deals  as  undesirable  and  impossible. 
Nevertheless, arms producers and dealers in Russia continued to be in touch with potential 
106 Taipei World Trade Center Information Materials, Moscow, March 1996.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 A. Borisov: "Torgovo-ekonomicheskie svyazi mezhdu Rossiei i Taivanem v 1994 godu", in: Problemy Dal'-
nego Vostoka, No. 6, 1995, p. 35.
110 Sinorama, Vol. 19, No. 8, 1994, pp. 8-9.
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customers in Taiwan.111 Some experts continued to argue in favour of arms sales to the island 
stressing that Taiwan could not possibly threaten the security of the PRC and that if the ROC did 
not receive arms from Russia then it could satisfy its defence needs elsewhere.112
Consistent attempts have been made to elicit  Taiwanese participation in developing Russian 
technology; in military conversion; in the production of turbines, engines, lasers and medical 
equipment;  and  in  environmental  protection.  Taiwanese businessmen have shown interest  - 
making business trips to Russia, participating in exhibitions, and signing various projects and 
memorandums. Taiwanese officials and experts acknowledge "great potential" in this field. A 
special project has been drafted by the Institute of Industrial Technology in Taipei for scientific 
and technical co-operation with Russia.113 However, the only sphere where a certain amount of 
progress can be registered is co-operation in radioactive waste disposal in Russia. The Taiwanese 
first approached their Russian counterparts in the spring of 1994. The Kurchatov Centre of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences was eager to make a lucrative deal, but under Russian law the deal 
was only possible if the Taiwanese bought nuclear fuel from Russia. Moreover, Russia's Ministry 
of Atomic Energy came under fire from environmental groups. In September 1995,  Russian 
legislation was changed to allow the disposal of imported radioactive waste at processing plants. 
Negotiations were renewed and they now cover the joint construction of a  scientific nuclear 
reactor in Taiwan.114
For a while it looked as if Taiwan might become one of the main investors in the Russian econ-
omy. But  the Taiwanese, prudent by nature and totally unfamiliar  with Russian conditions, 
stayed away from Russia. Among the negative features of the Russian market cited by Taiwanese 
businessmen  are  the  high  crime  rate,  corruption,  bureaucracy,  the  lack  of  proper  laws, 
overtaxation, deficiencies in the infrastructure, disorder, unclear political prospects etc. Special 
stress is put on the lack of an adequate legal framework for bilateral relations.115 The only case of 
Taiwanese direct investment in Russian industry is a joint venture in Nizhnii Novgorod with the 
participation of the Pacific Technique Development (Taipei). This firm has allocated huge sums 
for the production of a flying mechanism on a dynamic airfoil on the basis of Russian technology. 
In addition more than thirty Taiwanese trade companies have branch offices in Russia with 
warehouses. Most of them sell clothes and shoes, though some specialise in electronics. For 
example, the computer firm "Acer", which opened an office in Russia in 1994, managed in a 
short space of time to become the number 2 (after Hewlett-Packard) seller of computers on the 
Russian  market.  Each year  the sale  of Acers in  Russia  and other  CIS  countries doubles.116 
Generally  the  Taiwanese  authorities  do  not  recommend direct  investments  in  the  Russian 
economy as these are seen as "a dangerous endeavour".117 Nevertheless, Taipei estimates that 
between seven and ten new branch offices of Taiwanese companies will be opening in Russia 
annually.118
If the investment climate in Russia improves, Taiwanese participation may be expected in such 
industries as textiles, electronics, chemicals, paper and polygraphy, metallurgy, and hi-tech.119 
There are prospects that economic co-operation will be spurred through the opening of a pas-
111 Zhongguo shibao, 9 June 1992.
112 "Taivan' v politike Rossii", op. cit., pp. 43-46.
113 Free China Weekly, No. 8, 1995.
114 Zhongyang ribao, 6 September 1995. See also Izvestiya, June 1994.
115 Zhongyang ribao, 10 January 1996 and Lianhe bao, 4 February 1996.
116 Kommersant-Daily, 12 February 1996.
117 Lianhe bao, 20 August 1995.
118 Borisov, "Torgovo-ekonomicheskie...", op. cit., p. 36
119 Ibid.
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senger and cargo air service between Russian and Taiwanese cites. Negotiations on the air links 
looked promising in the initial stage but then stalled. Responding to Beijing’s demands Moscow 
and Taipei agreed that two unofficial aviation companies (one from each side) would perform the 
flights. Estimates showed that the line would become quite popular and profitable.120 But owing to 
the  absence of  a  Russian  visa  issuing office in  Taiwan  the  air  link  could  not  be  started. 
Nevertheless, negotiations were resumed, and in the near future the line Moscow-Hong-Kong-
Taipei may be launched. Direct sea lines may be established at a later date (at present container 
shipments from Russia to Taiwan take one-and-a-half to two months).121 There are increasing 
attempts to forge banking links. In May 1995 a representative delegation visited Taiwan and held 
negotiations that are still continuing. Taiwanese banks would like more freedom of action in 
Russia than is generally allowed.122
A comprehensive analysis of barriers in the way of economic relations between the RF and the 
ROC was carried out by the "China Institute of Economic Studies" in Taipei. The following 
problems were identified by the institute: 1) There are differences in the structure of the par-
ticipants in trade, in the legislation regulating their activities, and in their approaches and com-
mercial tactics. In Russia trade is controlled by large enterprises, in Taiwan small and medium-
sized firms prevail. 2) There is no methodology to make a comparison of the two very different 
economies and trade systems. 3) Industrial production in Russia is continuing to decline thus 
preventing the development of healthy economic ties.123 On the positive side, the above-mentioned 
Taiwanese  institute  points  out  that  the  Russian  market,  being  a  high-risk  market,  is  si-
multaneously a  highly profitable one; there are "quite a  few rich customers with developed 
tastes"124. The institute suggests that big companies might try their luck in such a market.125
3.4 Humanitarian links
The humanitarian dimension of Russo-Taiwanese relations is not very visible, and many Russian 
experts complain that  Taiwan is not particularly interested in this sphere of interaction with 
Russia. This judgement would seem to be incorrect, however. There is a growing humanitarian 
interest in Russia in Taiwan and, largely as a result of input on the Taiwanese side, humanitarian 
links  between the  RF  and  the  ROC  have  been  developing  in  recent  years.  Humanitarian 
exchanges are funded almost exclusively by the Taiwanese side: by the "Jiang Jingguo Founda-
tion", the "Cultural Planning and Development Council" (attached to the ROC government), the 
"Sinological Center", the "Pacific Foundation", the "Sinica Academy", various universities and 
other state and private institutions of the ROC. On the Russian side there are a  number of 
humanitarian-cultural associations professing an interest in Taiwan, but they lack funds and look 
for subsidies from Taiwan.
The most developed aspect of humanitarian exchanges are visits of Russian cultural groups to the 
ROC (this fact also testifies to the Taiwanese interest in Russian culture). Since 1990, forty-six 
ballet groups (including the Bolshoi Theatre), twenty-five orchestras, ten drama ensembles, five 
circus groups, and six museum exhibitions have toured the ROC. Festivals, "Russian days on 
Taiwan" and "Taiwanese days in Russia" have been organised.126 Scholarly exchanges have taken 
120 Lianhe bao, 1 August 1993.
121 Maoyi Kuaixun, 10 April 1995.
122 Maoyi Kuaixun, 4 February 1996.
123 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., pp. 46-47.
124 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 49.
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place in the natural sciences, philology, the Chinese and Russian languages and the social and 
political sciences. In the first field one of the channels for co-operation is the Institute of Nuclear 
Energy in Dubna, Russia. More than fifteen persons on both sides have been involved in joint 
research projects. Back in November 1991 a memorandum of understanding on co-operation was 
signed  between  the  National  Science  Council  of  Taiwan  and  the  USSR  Academy  of 
Engineering.127 The Taiwanese stressed the importance of inviting Russian scientists who could 
help the ROC to learn more about Russian weapons being supplied to the PRC and upgrade 
research in space technology. Philological studies involve three universities in Taiwan and more 
than ten in Russia. Around fifteen Russian sinologists have attended programs at the "Sinological 
Center" in Taipei. Exchanges in the social and political sciences have included visits to the ROC 
by the rectors of leading Russian universities and academic research institutes and many famous 
scholars (in total more than 100 persons in this category have visited the ROC, while around 
twenty Taiwanese have been guests of their Russian counterparts).128 Moreover, scholarly links 
have also been organised in the following forms: joint research on the basis of archives; joint 
publication of research work; joint conferences and seminars; and the exchange of lecturers and 
researchers. Such links are at the same impeded by the fact that Russian educational and research 
centres lack funds and have to rely on Taiwanese generosity, which has its limits and is actually 
decreasing. There is also the language barrier and the high cost of books and periodicals in both 
countries.
Notwithstanding the  fact  that  Taiwan  does much  to  promote  scholarly  co-operation,  some 
Russian scholars complain that the Taiwanese clearly prefer American colleagues to Russian 
ones and that  their  interest in  Russia  and Russian scholarly achievements is  very limited.129 
Student exchanges have also begun. Over 100 Taiwanese students have graduated from Russian 
universities, the majority in Russian language. Around 400 Taiwanese students took summer 
courses in Russian (the institutions ranging geographically from Vladivostok University to the 
Plekhanov Academy of Economy in Moscow). All study expenses in Russia are covered by pri-
vate  Taiwanese sources or  by the ROC Ministry of Education.  There are  also some thirty 
Russian students who have studied or are still studying in Taiwan. They are supported by the 
Taiwanese Ministry of Education (six scholarships per year) as well as by a number of individual 
universities.130 Sports links include gymnastics, the martial  arts and tennis. Tourism has been 
growing steadily with 10,255 Taiwanese visiting Russia in 1995 (9,570 persons in 1994 and 
9,206 persons in 1993). Russian tourists have not yet acquired a taste for Taiwanese resorts - 
there were fewer than 200 tourists in 1995).131
A special aspect of humanitarian links between Russia and Taiwan is aid from the ROC to 
Russia. In 1991 the ROC authorities approved humanitarian aid to Russia as a gesture of support 
for the post-Communist rehabilitation. Taiwan shipped 100,000 tons of rice worth 20 million 
US-$ to Russian ports. This move was met with gratitude in Russia and received very positive 
coverage in the Russian media (see, for example,  Izvestia, 16 January 1992). Later, in 1993, 
however, the local  authorities in some parts of Russia  bitterly complained that  the rice was 
contaminated.132 Taiwan took these charges quite seriously and the issue was investigated by the 
executive and legislative branches of the Taiwanese government. No wrongdoing was detected 
127 "Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States", Vol. 9, p. 234.
128 Data provided by TMC officials in March 1996.
129 E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", op. cit., p. 97.
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on the part  of suppliers.133 Meanwhile the media  in  Russia  came to the conclusion that  the 
Taiwanese rice had been replaced with low quality Central Asian rice by Russian criminals with 
official connection (Lobov was among those mentioned).134
As for the Russians' and Taiwanese knowledge about each other, this was close to zero back in 
the 1980s. The opening up of contacts produced an explosion of positive feeling on both sides, 
without either side, however, knowing what these were based on. The Russians praised Taiwan 
for its tremendous social and economic achievements and talked about virtually unlimited hori-
zons of co-operation with the island. But the actual status of Taiwan, its history and the present 
position of the KMT were distorted and misinterpreted.
In the meantime the situation has improved, and remarkably enough, Russian respect for Taiwan 
remains unchanged. There is a very special interest in the person of Chiang Ching-kuo because of 
the years he spent in the USSR and because of his Russian wife. A number of documentary 
movies have been e made about Chiang and shown on Russian TV, receiving a wide and positive 
response from the Russian public. His father, Chiang Kai-shek, who was bitterly denounced in 
Russia  for  decades also  now receives recognition.135 The  Taiwanese used to  be  even more 
ignorant of Russia than Russians were of Taiwan, mistaking Peter the Great for Lenin, thinking 
Moscow was a city full of polar bears and believing that Gorbachev was still the most popular 
politician in Russia.
Mutual knowledge is promoted by the media. A special role is played by the ROC Government 
Information Office (GIO). This agency funds invitations for Russian journalists to visit the ROC. 
Between 1992 and 1995 around 100 Russian journalists were received by leading Taiwanese 
media organs. In turn about 200 Taiwanese journalists toured around Russia as guests of TV 
stations  and  newspapers  or  as  tourists.  A  number  of  leading  Taiwanese  newspapers  have 
unofficial correspondents in Russia  (not accredited with the Russian Foreign Ministry),  who 
cover the Russian scene on a regular basis. During the period 1992-1995 these correspondents 
published no fewer than 1,000 articles on various aspects of the Russian internal situation and 
foreign policy. Some Taiwanese newspapers have agreements with Russian news agencies and 
newspapers on the exchange of information, and mutual assistance (for example, Argumenty i  
fakty with the Free China Review; and the Central News Agency with ITAR-TASS). The Tai-
wanese government widely distributes in Russia such publications as the Free China Chronicle, 
the Free China Review, Sinorama, and Svobodnyi Kitai. The Voice of Free China has regular 
transmissions in the Russian language. Beijing closely monitors these activities and has made a 
number of efforts to dissuade the Russian media from calling Taiwan a state. These attempts 
have meanwhile ceased, owing to their futility.
The opening up of relations with Taiwan has prompted a number of Russian scholars to take up 
Taiwanese studies. One of the first products of these studies was a special issue of  Problemy 
Dalnego Vostoka (No. 5, 1993). In March 1993 the first Russian-Taiwanese conference devoted 
to bilateral relations was held in Moscow at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  and  was  attended  by  an  ROC  delegation  led  by  the  director  of  the  Institute  of 
International Relations, Dr. Lin Bizhao. The proceedings were published. The following year 
several other conferences devoted to the ROC were convened. Russian scholars concentrate their 
research mainly on Taiwan's economic experience.136 Until the late 1980s studies on Russia in the 
ROC were limited to three Russian-language departments and one research unit that published 
133 Zhongyang ribao, 10 March 1993 and 2 June 1993.
134 As for the Taiwanese high-quality rice it was re-exported to Europe at a huge profit, which was pocketed by 
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articles on the USSR. Now there are a number of associations in Taiwan specialising in Russian 
studies: The Taipei Slavic Club, the Sino-Russian Economic Association, the Russia Institute 
(Dajiang University), the Institute of Russian Language and Literature (Wenhua University), and 
the Russian section of the Institute of International Relations (Zhengzhi University).
There have been a wide range of proposals from both sides concerning the expansion of cultural 
links. These include the signing of an official cultural agreement between the two governments, 
the convening of two or three conferences per year for the review of progress in the humanitarian 
field for the respective governments, the creation of a special fund to support humanitarian ex-
changes, the translation of scientific works, permanent expositions on the historical interaction of 
the Russian and Chinese cultures, the exchange of museum collections, and the publication of art 
books etc.
4. Russia and the "Taiwan crisis" in March 1996
The flaring up of tensions between the PRC and the ROC in the Taiwan straits in March 1996 
did not alter Moscow’s basic stand vis-ŕ-vis either Beijing or Taipei. There was no official re-
action from the Kremlin to the show of force by mainland China against the ROC. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov simply said that the events in the Taiwan straits  “will not 
influence in any way” Yeltsin's upcoming visit to the PRC.137 Privately some Russian diplomats 
disapproved of Beijing's actions, but not so much because of sympathy towards Taipei as out of 
concern for peace and stability in a region vital to Russia.138
The State Duma's reaction was more complex. On the whole the Russian legislature did not pay 
much  attention to  the  crisis  in  the  Taiwan  straits:  the  deputies were preoccupied with  the 
upcoming elections and did not detect anything in the Beijing-Taipei confrontation that could be 
useful  in  fighting their  own domestic  political  battles (unlike  their  counterparts  in  the  US 
Congress). However, some members of the State Duma did take certain steps pertaining to the 
events in the Taiwan straits.
Once again Zhirinovsky's LDPR was conspicuous in its show of friendship towards the ROC. A 
ranking member of the LDPR, Aleksei Mitrofanov, head of the Duma’s Committee on Geo-
political  Problems,  led  a  Committee  delegation  to  Taiwan  while  the  crisis  was  going  on 
(18.03.96-26.03.96). While in Taipei Russian legislators discussed the question of opening a 
representative office of Russian business and cultural circles there. The Russian guests stressed 
that since the MTC was not ready to set up a permanent mission on the island this could be done 
instead  by  "The  Council  on  Trade  and  Industrial  Co-operation  Russia-Taiwan"  (CTIC). 
Mitrofanov advertised the Council as "a union of Russian enterprises and scientific organisations 
interested  in  the  speedy promotion  of  concrete  projects  involving  industrial,  scientific  and 
technical co-operation with their Taiwanese partners".139
Upon returning from the ROC Mitrofanov called a  meeting of his Committee to discuss the 
problem of the  "asymmetry"  in  the  triangle Moscow-Beijing-Taipei.  While not  in  any way 
challenging  the  importance  of  Russo-Chinese  relations  and  the  concept  of  one  China,  the 
Committee members nonetheless insisted on a more energetic promotion of unofficial ties with 
136 For a detailed analysis of Taiwanese studies in Russia, see E. Bazhanov (Ed.): "Problems and Prospects...", 
op. cit., pp. 138-146.
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Taiwan.  The  Committee allowed itself just  one piece of  criticism of the PRC's  behaviour, 
stressing that  “Beijing's sabre  rattling in  the close vicinity of Taiwan  during the period of 
democratic presidential elections, the arrival of the American fleet in the region to gain 'control 
over the situation' - all these developments provide serious grounds for reconsidering the role and 
capabilities of Russia in the balance of forces in this region".140 At a  meeting of the Foreign 
Relations Committee N. Stolyarov also made a statement in support of the ROC vis-ŕ-vis the 
PRC. The statement was dismissed by Nikolai  Ryzhkov, a  fellow deputy and former Soviet 
prime minister, as "a private remark" and nobody else at the meeting paid any attention to the 
issue.141 Yet another deputy, the radical democrat Egor Gaidar, was present as an observer at the 
Taiwanese  presidential  elections  and  made  certain  unfavourable  comments  about  Beijing's 
military games in the straits.
However, and this is the most important fact, all the above-mentioned actions and statements by 
members of the Duma went completely unnoticed by the Russian public and media (save for a 
small and incoherent report by Izvestia on Mitrofanov's committee meeting).142 As for the overall 
coverage of the Taiwan straits crisis by the Russian media it had two specific features. First of 
all, it proved to be very unprofessional. Most newspaper journalists and TV moderators grossly 
misinterpreted the events, erroneously believing that there was a real danger of a major war and 
that Beijing was about to launch an attack on the island. One newspaper expressed concern that 
"for the last thirty years there has never been such a high level of tension between the PRC and its 
‘rebel’ province, the island of Taiwan, as there is now."143 According to the same newspaper, CCP 
Chairman Jiang Zemin had announced that "China was not promising not to use armed force for 
the unification of Taiwan with the mainland" and "Deng Xiaoping has already given the order to 
use such force".144 The journalists obviously did not realise that Jiang Zemin was simply repeating 
the long-standing standard position, which constituted not so much a threat as an expression of 
Beijing's refusal  to  give assurances to an  outside power on a  purely internal  Chinese issue 
(occasionally the statement was accompanied by the clarification that Beijing would never allow 
Chinese to fight against Chinese).
The Russian media was also wrong in persistently presenting Lee Teng-hui as "the main sepa-
ratist," whose victory in the Taiwanese elections Beijing was trying hard to prevent (in reality the 
PRC undoubtedly preferred Lee to his main rival in the elections, a  real and open separatist 
candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party). As Kommersant-Daily insisted, Beijing and 
Taipei “associated the idea of independence with the name of Lee Teng-hui”.145 Izvestia was the 
only newspaper which in some of its articles (but  not all)  presented a  more or less realistic 
analysis of the situation. It called the events "an act of the Beijing opera where each actor is 
playing a well-established part, all too well-known to the other actors and the mature audience".146 
Izvestia's Beijing correspondent explained that the PRC did not have the military potential for 
attacking the island,147while its correspondent in Washington added that Beijing "right away gave 
assurances that it did not have any plans for the seizure of the island" and that it had asked the 
Americans through diplomatic channels "not to get nervous about trivial matters".148
140 Ekspertnaya otsenka..., op. cit., p. 2.
141 Interview with members of the Foreign Relations Committee.
142 Vladimir Mikheev: "Na Taiwan' russkie samolety ne letayut i korabli ne khodyat", in Izvestiya, 18 April 1996, 
p. 5.
143 Obshchaya gazeta, 14-20 March 1996.
144 Ibid. See also Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 March 1996 and Kommersant-Daily, 12 March 1996.
145 Kommersant-Daily, 12 March 1996.
146 Izvestiya, 13 March 1996.
147 Izvestiya, 14 March 1996.
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The media coverage was not openly pro-Taiwan, but, as could be seen from the tone and ar-
rangement of the information, Russian newspapers and TV networks were surprised by the 
apparent extremism of mainland China and felt sorry for Taiwan. They reminded readers that the 
Chinese Communists had in the past (1954 and 1958) shelled Kuomintang-controlled islands 
near Taiwan and that this had "almost triggered a major military conflict between the USSR and 
the USA".149 Later, because of the establishment of official relations with Washington, "Beijing 
had no choice but to adopt the tactics of peaceful confrontation".150 The media emphasised that 
Taiwan was holding "the first free presidential elections in the entire history of China" and that 
"for this act the Taiwanese could pay dearly".151
But despite these critical undertones the reactions in Moscow didn't had any negative impact on 
the further development of Russian-Chinese relations as was demonstrated during Yeltsin's China 
visit only one month later in April 1996.
149 Segodnya, 12 March 1996.
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Summary
Introductory Remarks
This report describes and analyses of the history of Russia's ties with the Chinese island Taiwan 
and its relationship with the Kuomintang (KMT) both during the period when it ruled over the 
whole of China and after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949. The bulk of the report is devoted to the 
warming of relations between Moscow and Taipei that took place during 1991 and 1992 and to 
the state of these relations today.
Findings
1. With the establishment of a permanent diplomatic mission in China in 1861 Russia began to 
take an interest in Taiwan and closely watched Japanese encroachments on the island. 
Some Russian diplomats as well as prominent Taiwanese urged the Tsar to intervene, but 
St. Petersburg abstained for a number of reasons.
2. From the 1920s to the 1940s Bolshevik Russia was deeply involved in political events in 
China. This left a deep imprint on the destiny of that country and on that of the KMT in 
particular. Relations between the Kremlin and the KMT underwent a sharp deterioration, 
from a revolutionary alliance to outright hostility.
3. After the conclusion of the treaty between Stalin and Mao in 1950 and the outbreak of the 
Korean war (1950-1953) the alienation between the USSR and the KMT-regime on Tai-
wan became total.  When relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated in  the 
1960s the Kremlin became engaged in secret contacts with Taipei. Nothing much came 
of these, however.
4. "Perestroika" and "new thinking" in the USSR opened opportunities for unfreezing Soviet 
Taiwanese relations. The rapprochement was slow owing to lingering suspicions on the 
part of the KMT old guard and the Kremlin's fear of antagonising Beijing. By 1990, 
though, both Moscow and Taipei could no longer restrain the mutual enthusiasm that had 
been  developing  among  business  circles  in  both  countries.  China  appealed  to  "the 
socialist  solidarity"  of  Gorbachev  who  did  his  best  to  satisfy  Beijing's  demands 
concerning official Soviet policy vis-ŕ-vis Taiwan.
5. Circumstances in Russia radically changed in 1992. Russia ceased to be a "socialist" state 
and focused its attention on the West. For the Russian democrats Taiwan was a much 
more appealing Asian partner than Communist China. Taiwan, for its part, hoped to 
achieve official relations with its former adversary.
6. The initial euphoria accompanying the warming of Russo-Taiwanese relations did not last 
long. A conservative shift in Russia resulted in a  reorientation towards China and a 
cooling off towards the ROC. Accordingly, Taiwanese interest in Russia declined.
7. Nevertheless, relations between Moscow and Taiwan continue to progress and some legal 
foundations have been laid. On April 16, 1992 the two sides agreed to set up the Mos-
cow-Taipei and the Taipei-Moscow "Economic and Cultural Co-operation Co-ordination 
Commission" (MTC and TMC) to promote ties in various non-political spheres. Beijing 
protested against this agreement, and President Yeltsin issued a decree on September 15, 
1992 confirming the standard position on "one China" and prohibiting any official or 
political  contacts  with  Taiwan.  In  addition,  Moscow  and  Beijing  reached  an 
understanding on the limitations of Russo-Taiwanese relations in the autumn of 1992. 
Thus, the legal foundations for ties between Russia and the ROC clearly need further 
improvement.
8. The political dialogue between Moscow and Taipei, which was quite active during 1991 and 
1992, is more restrained now. The TMC has opened a permanent office in Russia, but the 
Russian side, owing to political in-fighting, still  does not have any representation in 
Taiwan.  Nevertheless,  this  has  not  prevented  some  Russian  political  parties  and 
parliamentary circles from promoting exchanges with the ROC.
9. Experts agree that there is great potential for developing trade and economic co-operation 
between Russia and Taiwan. So far this potential has not been exploited to the full. The 
only dynamic element is bilateral trade. Growing annually by over 60% it is overwhelm-
ingly in favour of Russia, which has become one of the main suppliers of steel and cotton 
to the island. For a while both sides played with the idea of trading armaments, but then 
dropped it. The Taiwanese have refrained from investing in Russia because the Russian 
market is perceived in Taiwanese business circles as problematic.
10. The humanitarian dimension of Russo-Taiwanese relations is not very visible. Yet there are 
cultural exchanges, scholarly co-operation and joint scientific research programs and a 
growing number of Taiwanese students are studying at Russian universities. Media links 
are also increasing.
11. The "Taiwan crisis" in March 1996 did not alter Moscow's stand vis-ŕ-vis either Beijing or 
Taipeh. The Russian government refrained from open statements and Russian media cov-
erage was not openly pro-Taiwan.
